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I: IN'l'llODOOTION: DOGMATISM AND SPEECH COMMUNICATION ----------
One legacy of World War II which has continued to atimulate 
concern and reaearch in the behavioral aciencea ia the interest in 
what has come to be known aa "the authoritarian personality." Se.eking 
aaae explanation of anti-aemltism and the behavior of dictators and 
millions of people seemingly willing to be governed by them, 
psychiatrists and psychologists in the early 1940'• began to ask 
whether there might be a personality characteristic or group of 
characteristics which would predispose those millions toward intoler-
ant, authoritarian. behavior. 
Beginning with the work of Pro1mn and the observations of 
Maslow during World War II, a fully developed theory of intolerance 
and authoritarianism and a corresponding measure of Paciam emerged 
and culminated with the 1950 publication of~ Authoritarian 
Personality (Adorno, et al.). The publication of Rokeach'a !!!!, Open 
and Closed Mind in 1960 resulted in a re-thinking of authoritarianism - ------- -
in terms of ••dogmatism" theory, a conceptualization of "generalized 
authoritarianism" which served to increase and extend interest in 
the authoritarian or "closed" personality. This inte~at continued 
unabated throughout the 1960's, producing a large body of literature 
from which several important questions have emerged; questions about 
the validity of the theoretical construct itself and about its 
relationship to other variable• of human personality and interaction. 
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Although most of the research on dogmatism and authoritarian-
ism reported in social science journals has cme from the fields of 
psychology, sociology, and educational psychology, dogmatism theory 
has had significant impact on research in Speech Communicatione 
Specifically, the dogmatism model is highly relevant to Speech 
Communication in that it speaks directly ~o the question of wh~ther 
there is a personality trait which determines how an organism will 
receive and process new information. Dogmatism theory is an analytic 
tool which claims to offer explanatory and predictive insights into 
the effects of communication on human beings of all backgrounds, 
idealogical persuasions, and even levels of intelligence. Wide use 
of the Dogmatism Scale seems to reflect an awareness that, to the 
extent of its validity, the theory identifies a variable which 
operates in every act of communication both in and out of the 
laboratory. The California "F" Scale and the Dogmatism "D" Scales 
are used widely in various research efforts where authoritarianism 
is thought to be a potentially significant variable. 
This study will begin with a review of literature in the 
area of dogmatism and learning in Chapter II. Chapter III will 
develop the rationale for investigating the relationship between 
dogmatism and comprehension in learning and persuasion. This 
chapter will also specify hypoth.eses for the study and describe the 
procedure used to test them. Chapter IV will summarize results of 
the study and comment on their possible significance for an under-
standing of dogmatism as a personality construct. 
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II: RIVIBW OF LITERATURE ON DOGMATISM, WITH A FOCUS ON LEARNING --- - ----- - ---- - - -
It will be the initial task of this study to review 
literature on dogmatism focusing on literature which applies to 
the area of learning. "Iaarning" has been defined by Kenneth E. 
Anderson as a process of acquisition or modification of beliefs, 
attitudes, and values, resulting from an organism's interaction 
with the implicit in this definition is that 
learning will result in the acquisition and modification of corres-
ponding types and patterns of behavior. Accordingly, the literature 
to be reviewed will refer variously to absorption of new information, 
persuasion, and changes in beliefs and values as part of that process 
of altering and modifying the human organism which I shall call 
"learning." 
In order to provide an historical and scientific perspective 
for the co~cept of dogmatism, this chapter will trace the develop-
ment of the authoritarianism concept, briefly SllmJlarize basic dogma-
tism theory as formulated by Rokeach and his associates, and trace 
in acme detail the research which has followed the publishing of 
Rokeach'a basic work and which applies to the study of learning. 
A. EARLY INVESTIGATIONS 
Among the earliest to postulate authoritarianism as a 
2 personality attribute was Promm. Be identified it as motivating 
1Kenneth Anderson, Introduction .!:.2_ Communication Theory 
,!!!! Practice, <Menlo Park, California: Cummings Publishing Co., 
1972). 
2 Brich Promm, Bscape !£2!! Preedcm, (New York: Parrar and 
Rinehart, Inc., 1941). 
4 
some forms of masochistic and sadistic behavior (i.e. irrational 
behavior which results in pain and suffering may be motivated by 
authoritarian reliance on others or authoritarian dominance over 
3 others). In particular, masochism was seen as evidence that an 
"escape mechanism" was being employed: that the individual was 
seeking "to get rid of the burden of freedam • ..4 Such a person is 
characterized by feelings of aloneness and insignificance, by 
willingness to "give oneself up" for the sake of another. 5 Fromm 
comments: "The feature common to all authoritarian thinking is 
the conviction that life is determined by forces outside of man's 
own self, his interest, his wishes."6 
In 1943 Maslow7 reported some general conclusions he had 
derived after extended clinical observations of persons he judged 
to be authoritarians. Maslow noted that his interest in authori-
tarianism was stimulated by Fromm, and he concurred with much of 
Fromm's analysis. For ex•ple, Maslow described the submissive 
authoritarian in terms of masochism, avoidance of responsibility 
for one's own fate, compulsive concern for order, and other 
characteristics which run parallel to Fr011111.'a modet.8 Reflecting 
3Ibid., - PP• 143-44. 
4Ibid., - p. 1:52. s 160. Ibid., p. -
C5 172. Ibid., P• -
7A. H. Maslow• "The Authoritarian Character Structure," 
Journal 2! Social Psr.hology. Bulletin .2.£ The Society-~~ Psycho-
logical Study !! Soc al 1ss11e•• 18• No. 4 (November, 19!+3)• -401-411. 
8lbid., pp. 408-411. -
5 
the wartime setting, however, Maslow extended his discussion 
beyond authoritarian submissiveness into the area of authoritarian 
dominance. 
B. !!!,! AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY 
The history of the concept of authoritarianism has been 
written by Nevitt Sanford.9 Sanford credits Froann for Fromm's 
work on masochism and sadism, but begins the narrative of the 
development of the authoritarianism concept with studies in anti-
Semitism, begun in 1943 by Sanford and Levinson10 at the lhiversity 
of California, Berkeley. 
Sanford reports that the first task was to develop a scale 
for measuring anti-Semitism. This was developed from interviews of 
authoritative persons and first published in 1944.11 The work was 
continued with support from the Department of Scientific Research 
of The .American Jewish Committee, and soon included names such as 
MBlc Horkheimer of the Institute of Social Research, Else Frenkel-
Brunswick, Suzanne Reichard, and Horkheimer's close associate, 
T. w. Adorno. This research culminated in the publication of 
.!!!!, Authoritarian Personality12 published in 19S0. 
9a. Nevitt Sanford, "The Approach of, the Authoritarian 
Personality,'1 in James L. McCary, ed., Psychololl 2£. Personality1 
(New York: Logos Press, 1965), PP• 255-319. 
10 !lli•• P• 261. 
11 D. Levinson, and N. Sanford, "A Scale for the Measurement 
of Anti-Semitism," .Journal Psychology, 17 (1944), PP• 339-70. 
12 T. w. Adorno, Blee Frehkel-Brunswick 1 Daniel J. Levinson, 
and R. Nevitt Sanford, .!1!!, Authoritarian Personality, (New York: 
Harper and Row, 19S0). 
In defending The Authoritarian Personality, Sanford13 notes 
that the work was carried on by the authors relatively independently 
in widespread geographic locations and did not represent a unified 
research effort. Be argues that the work should not be evaluated 
by the same standards "which ordinarily hold for researches, in well-
tilled fields, which set out to provide a crucial test of some 
failiar hypothesia."14 Authoritarian Personality is described 
as exploratory, made possible by the availability of money and 
freedom for the researchers, and is baaed on interviews, sampling, 
and generalization which, in spite of an effort to maintain highest 
research standards, "will have to be followed up and checked by 
more exacting me-chods."1' 
Among the hypothetical components of authoritarianism or 
facism which the researchers gleaned from interviews with anti-
Semitic subdects were "conventionalism" (value placed on customary 
mores), "authoritarian submission," "authoritarian aggression, .. 
"superstition and stereotypy," "power and toughness" (preoccupation 
with a strength-weakness dimension), and others.16 
!!!!_ Authoritarian Personality begins with a description of 
facism or authoritarianism as a personality characteristic which 
causes susceptibility to "anti-democratic propaganda." Authori-
tarianism is seen as causally "behind" and contributing to certain 
13sanford, pp. 261-262. 
14Ibid -·· pp. 264. 
15Ibid., PP• 266. 
16Ibid., pp. 269-275. 
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17 behavior. It ia viewed as both fixed and flexible; that is, it 
is an enduring feature of personality structure, but it represents 
one end of a continu\lD along which people may be seen as located 
relative to other people.18 
Methodologically, the authors used questionnaires which 
aimed at discovering what range of responses were relevant to anti-
Semitism. Interviews and Thematic Apperception Tests were used to 
gain insights which "would permit inferences about the deeper 
layers of the subject's personality. 019 From these investigations 
was evolved the F Scale which attempts to measure facisistic 
tendencies of personality, the E or ethnocentrism scale (which in 
final form included items from the anti-semitism test), and the 
PEC or "politio-economic conservatism" scale. 
In 1958, Christie and Cook20 reported 230 published works 
relating to authoritarianism, the majority of which was in response 
to or extension of~ Authoritarian Personality. They called the 
book "an essentially new formulation of a basic question,"21 to 
which the scholarly response had been massive. Their summary of 
literature on authoritarianism includes correlations of P Scale 
responses with .. political attitudes," "social sophistication," 
17Adorno, pp. 1-2, s. 
18tbid •, p. 7. 
19~ •• p. 17. 
20Richard Christie, and Peggy Cook, "A Guide to Published 
Literature Relating to the Authoritarian Personality Through 1956,n 
3ournal !:?,! Psychology, 45, Second Half (April, 1958), 
21 Ibid., 171 - p. • 
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"child rearing,n °interpersona1 behavior," "minority group member-
ship, ' 9 and prejudice, as well as methodological and other consider-
ations,. 22 
C ROKEACH' S DOGMATISM THEORY 
The work of Milton Rokeach builds on and extends the idea 
of authoritarianism,. Rokeach envisioned a study of authoritarianism 
not only of the right 9 but authoritarianism conceived as a part of 
one's personality structure, distinct from idealogical content, and 
thus discoverable in persons of all ranges of politics or other 
ideolo~y. Rokeach says: " ••• we should proceed from right authori-
tarianism not to re-focus on left authoritarianismeu23 
Rokeach 1 s theory received its fullest exposition in 
!he~~ Closed Mind (1960).24 This book represents the most 
searching investigation of authoritarianism up to that time, and 
since its publication it has served as the foundation for most 
significant research in the area. Attempting much more than to 
refine earlier authoritarian personality theory, Rokeach has 
developed a personality model which, he argues, applies to and 
explicates a very wide range of human behavior. He begins with a 
discussion of "belief structures." 
I. Be.lief Structures~ Rokeach envisions dogmatism and 
h · i · 25 f f 1· aut or1tar an1sm as a structural eature o persona itv~ Rather 
22 Ibid~, p. 172 0 
23Milton Rokeach, The~ !!!..2. Closed Mind, (New York: 
Basic Books, Inc., 1960), p. 14. 
24~. 
25Rokeach prefers "dogmatism" but 11authoritarianism11 is 
equivalent 9 so long as it is not used to indicate authoritarianism 
only of the right. 
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than being limited to any one belief or set of beliefs within an 
individual, the extent to which one is open or closed minded affects 
all cognitive activity. 
Specifically, the Rokeach modet 26 sees beliefs organized 
along a central-peripheral continuum. Central beliefs are those 
basic, "'Primitive" beliefs about the nature of one's self and the 
world in which he lives~ In the intermediate region are located 
beliefs about the nature of authority. and what people represent 
authoritative sources of information for him. The peripheral region 
encompasses beliefs and disbeliefs whose assimilation is the result 
of their coming from positive or negative authority figures in the 
intermediate region. 
Beliefs, according to Rokeach, are organized into "systems," 
a term which refers simply to groupings both of beliefs and disbeliefs. 
The belief system includes everything "that a person at a given time 
accepts as true of the world he lives in," and the disbelief system 
includes all that "a person at a given time rejects as fa1Se.u27 The 
disbelief system is divided into disbelief subsystems which represent 
groupings of disbeliefs according to some relationship among the 
specific beliefs included.28 
Rokeach takes pains to say that belief systems are not to 
be regarded only as religious or political or scientific systems, 
since any one belief could be said to fit all three of those cate-
26 Rokeach, ,!!!!! C1osed ~' PP• 39 ff. 
27 
~•• P• 33. 
28~ •• p. 35. 
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gories and the h\lDan mind does not make such discreet divisions. 
But some d:l vision of disbelief· subsys'tems according to inter-
relationah ips of beliefs has already been made explicit, and one 
sees Rokeach referring at least implicitly to belief subsystems as 
well. For example, when describing laboratory experiments, Rokeach 
describes subjects as facing the taisk of assimilating .,a new belief 
system that is at odds with a previously held belief system. 1129 
Since a relatively small number of new beliefs is included in these 
studies, Rokeach appears to use the term ''belief system" to apply 
to something less than everything accepted as true by the individual. 
Th.is usage occurs again in a problem-solving experiment in 
which subjects are said to be integrating three new beliefs into tta 
new system."30 Even though belief systems are not only political, 
scientific, or religious, they evidently may be so. Rokeach at one 
point speaks of " ••• beliefs of a new system (political, religious, 
scientific, etc.) ••• " 31 In short, a belief system for Rokeach may 
be any grouping of related beliefs, or may be the totality of what 
one accepts as true. 
2. Dogm.atj.~ Resistance' !2, Change. At this point the 
contrast between open-mindedness and closed-mindedness comes into 
focus. To the extent that one is open-minded, or low in dogmatism, 
he will assimilate new information "!! !!,, " according to its own 
merits. When new information is received by the open-minded person, 
29.!2!!!•• p. 286. 
30.!!!!!!•' p. 211. 
31tbid., p. 286. -
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the individual beliefs in his belief system will be re-arranged 
and adjusted, as necessary, in keeping with the merits of the 
content and implications of the new information. To the extent 
that one is closed-minded, on the other hand, new information will 
be assimilated only if it is seen as emanating from or consistent 
with an external positive authority source. It is accepted not 
on its own merits but on its relationship to authority. The 
result may be that the new information will be distorted to.fit 
the existing belief system which already contains beliefs fed the 
individual by some accepted positive authority source.32 
In terms of the central-peripheral continuum, the highly 
dogmatic person is seen as follows: his central beliefs include a 
view of the world as threatening, his intermediate beliefs hold 
authority to be absolute (and evaluate other people in terms of 
how they relate to that authority), and his peripheral beliefs 
(which come to him through his authorities) are isolated from each 
other, a feature of his belief system which allows conflicting beliefs 
to be held simultaneously.33 This closed minded approach is seen as 
warding off threats to the individual's cognitive structure, pro-
viding him security in a seemingly unfriendly and threatening world. 
3. DopatiSII !!!! Susceptibility~ Change. One of the 
least understood and most overlooked areas of dopatiSII theory has 
to do with susceptibility to change. Given new information which 
does not come fl'OII a highly authoritative source, the implication 
32Ibid., pp. SO and 57 1 ff. -33Ibid., PP• S4 ff. -
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of the theory is that the h,igh-dogmatic subject will be more 
resistant to attitude or belief change than the low-dogmatic 
individual. But basic dog1natiam theory asserts that the closed-
minded person should be highly susceptible to change if the 
suggestion for change comes from a highly authoritative source. 
In such a situation the closed-minded person will be expected to 
change more or more easily than the open-minded subject.34 
This view of the dogmatic person as susceptible to change 
stems from the fact that such a person, relying heavily on 
authority, is a "party-line,. thinker in that he accepts uncriti-
cally beliefs suggested by highly authoritative sources.35 'lb.is 
susceptibility to change is made possible in part by the pheno-
menon of "isolation" of peripheral beliefs already mentioned above. 
Newly assimilated beliefs in the system of a closed-minded person 
are not related logically to other, already held, peripheral 
belie~s. Because they are accepted on the recommendation of 
positive authority figures, these beliefs are held uncritically, 
resulting in "the coexistence of logically contradictory beliefs 
within the belief system." This is made possible by the closed-
minded person's "perception of irrelevance," his tendency to avoid 
contradiction by refusing to recognize logical relatedness of con-
flicting beliefs. 36 
We shall see that this persuasibility of dogmatic persons 
34~ •• pp. 336-337. 
35 Ibid. • p. 49. -
36tbid., pp. 36-37. 
13 
as "party-line" thinkers is variously misunderstood, defended, and 
seriously challenged by subsequent research on dogmatism. 
4. Dopa.ti•,~ Authoritariani•• There is, of course, 
a great deal more to Rokeach's basic conceptualization than the 
above. We shall encounter additional issues when we examine 
research relating to dogmatism and learning. However, before 
reviewing the literature on dogmatism since 1960, it is perhaps 
appropriate that we elaborate on the relationship between authori-
tarianism and dogmatism. Much of the literature selected for the 
following review deals explicitly with authoritarianism as concep-
tualized by Adorno, !! !! (1950). Let us ask whether it is proper 
to apply questions and findings regarding authoritarianism to 
Rokeach'a model of open- and closed-mindedness. 
As we have suggested, Rokeach believes that he is working 
with "generalized authoritarianism," authoritarianiam which is not 
bound to the idealogical left or right. The primary distinction he 
makes between his formµlation of authoritarianism and those of 
earlier researchers is that open- and closed-mindedness is not 
limited to rightist, fascistic manifestationa.37 
Rokeach argues that his conceptualization of dogmatiaa as 
embodied in the "D" and "B" scales correlates just as basic dogma-
tism theory would predict with authoritarianism as measured by the 
"P" scale. Using an opinionation scale developed Dy tlis colleague, 
and himself, Rokeach shows subjects with rightist leanings scoring 
37 i Ib d., PP• 11 ff. -
high on both the "D11 and "P" scales, and compares them to highly 
opinionated subjects with leftist tendencies scoring high on the 
"Dtt scale, but not on the "F" scale. 38 
Other researchers have offered evidence to suggest that 
dogmatism is generalized authoritarianism. Hanson (1968)39 
compared scores on the "B" scale to authoritarianism as measured 
by the Stern .. Stereopathy-Acquiescence" scales. He found signi-
ficant correlations between dogmatism and authoritarianism, but 
fotmd that dogmatism was not exactly equally weighted between left 
and right idealogical tendencies. Ther~ was a non-significant, 
but consistent leaning to the right~ a finding almost identical to 
Rokeach's own. These findings appear, however, to support generally 
the notion that dogmatiSll is idealogically unbounded authoritari-
anism. 
Additional support comes from Barker,40 who ran multiple 
correlations of the F scale (authoritarianism) and the E scale 
(dogmatism) with the TICA (Test for Tolerance-Intolerance of 
Cognitive Ambiguity of Siegel, 1954), the .Anti-Intraception Test 
(Hantman and Getze1s, 1955), Attitud~ to Authority Scale (Mishler. 
1953), tests of conservation (PEC) and political self-labelling, 
and the author's own Censorship-tendency measure. He concluded 
38~ •• pp. 109 ff. 
39navid J. Hanson, "Dogmatism and Authoritarianism," 
!!!!, Journal .2£. Social Psychology, Vol. 76, 1968, PP• 89-9S. 
40Bdwin Barker, "Authoritarianism of the Political Right, 
Center, and Left," The Journal of Social, tesuea, Vol. XIX, No. 2, 
April, 1963. - -
,];5 
that the B scale is indeed a measure of authoritarianism of the 
right and left. The study "appeared to justify using Dogmatism 
and Censorship as a meas~re of general authoritarianism." In 
addition, most researchers interested in dogmatism tacitly concur 
with the above writers, applying the findings of research using 
authoritarian subjects to questions related specifically to dogma-
tism. 
In summary• Rokeach is supported'by other resear,chers in 
holding dogmatism to be a generalized, non-ideological form of 
authoritarianism. As we shall see, this is not only one of the 
strengths of dogmatism theory, it is also a source of criticism 
of the dogmatism model. Many of the questions raised about 
authoritarianism may now be asked about dogmatism as well. 
D. RESEARCH IN DOGMATISM AND LEARNING SINCE 1960 ---- - ---- - ---- --- -
A perusal of the published literature since 1960 reveals 
several hundred studies aimed directly at an elaboration or test-
ing of dogmatism theory, and hundreds more which utilize or 
account for the concept in related experiments. Tb.ere is no 
question that Rokeach's reconceptualization of authoritarianism 
has stimulated research interest. 
Not the least of the interest areas has been in the area 
of learning.41 To the extent that open- and closed-mindedness 
has to do with assimilation of new information, it is appropriate 
that learning be a prime area for testing and applying the theory. 
4111i.arning" ia used ill a broad sense which includes 
acceP,tance of and positive response to new ideas, information 
and sug~estions for change in attitude and behavior. 
What follows is a sunanary and assessment of literature on 
dogmatism and learninge 
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1. Literature~ Dogmatism and Resistance~ Chan~~• 
The first area of investigation into dogmatism and learning is 
typified by studies which have attempted to show negative corre-
lations between a person's level of dogmatism and his suscepti-
bility to changeo As we have already seen, this over-simplified 
interpretation of Rokeach is one which he denies explicitly,42 
but the misconception has stimulated many experiments whose 
results may be at least partially relevant. Several of these 
studies have been summarized by Ehrlich and Lee 43 in their review 
of dogmatism and learning. 
Rokeach 1 s model of dogmatism anticipates that the highly 
dogmatic person will assimilate new information less efficiently 
than the non-dogmatic person under some circumstances. Rokeach 
and his associates developed a problem solving task. the rather 
famous "Doodlebug" problem. which requires the subject to give up 
some prior beliefs and assimilate new ones in order to solve the 
problem. low-dogmatic subjects solved this problem faster than 
high-dogmatic subjects. 44 Rokeach argues that two distinct 
processes are involved in the solution of the problem: "analysis," 
overcoming old beliefs which are recognized as inappropriate; and 
42see discussion above. 
43 H. J. Ehrlich, and Dorothy t.ee, 11Dogmatism, Learning 
and Resistance to Change," ~sychological Bulletin, 71, No. 4, 
(April, 1969), pp.,249-2S9. 
44Rokeach, !!!!_~~Closed Mind, pp. 196 ff. 
17 
"synthesis," integrating the new beliefs (required for solution) 
into "a new belief system. t.4.5 Be offers evidence that open-
minded and closed-minded subjects do not differ significantly in 
their analytic abilities, but do differ in their ability to 
synthesize the new infomation into a new belief system. 
Among the earliest investigators was Bhrlich46 (1961a and 
1961b). Be compared doglnatism, achievement in an undergraduate 
sociology course (measured by grade comparisons), and scores on 
a psychological inventory. Upon completion of the course, low 
dogmatism scores were fomd to be significantly correlated with 
high grade achievement and high scores on the psychological 
inventory. An attempt was made also to follow up the same stu-
dents after a five year lapse. In this later study grade point 
averages did not correlate significantly with dogmatism, and 
Ehrlich suggests that course content, (including courses other 
than sociology) may have intervened. 
Another attempt at correlating classroom performance with 
47 dogmatism scores was made by Costin. Be failed to find a signi-
ficant relationship between dogmatiSlll and achievement among under-
graduates in psychology. Costin concluded that the dogmatism 
45tbid., PP• 174-175. -
46H. J. Ehrlich, "Dogmatism and Learning/' Journal of 
Abnormal !!!2, Social Psfihology, 62 (1961), PP• 148-149 (a) and 
H. J. Ehrlich, "Dog,.uat sm and Learning: A Five-Year Follow-Up," 
Psychological Reports, 9 (1961), PP• 283-286 (b). 
47P. Costin, "Dogmatism an.d Learning: A Follow-Up of 
Contradictory Findings," Journal of Bducational Research, S9 
(1965), pp. 186-188. -
18 
scale may measure only one~ of dogmatism (i.e., that which is 
relevant only to "controversial social relationships and public 
behavior" as in the Ehrlich study of achievement in sociology), and 
that dogmatism itself may be "differentially related" to learning 
in different kinds of subject matter.48 
Some studies, however, have succeeded in showing an inverse 
correlation between dogmatism and learning. White and Alter49 
reported testing 2 1099 undergraduate psychology students over a 
two year period at the University of Utah, and found "statistically 
significant correlations between D scores and examination scores," 
but only from larger classes. However, the variability of correla-
tions, even among classes taught by the same teacher i1as so great 
that the authors suggested 0 the predictive power of the D Scale with 
regard to grades is not impressive."SO 
In 1968, Costin51 again studied dogmatism and classroom 
achievement among psychology students. He hopothesized that dogma-
tism would not be related to students• assimilation of basic princi-
ples of psychology, but that dogmatism would correlate positively 
with students• "retention of specific false beliefs about human 
behavior."52 Costin reports both hypotheses confirmed, notably the 
48 Ibid., PP• 187-188. -
49B. J. White and R. D. Alter, "Dogmatism and Examination 
.Performance," Journal of Educational Psychology," 58, (1967), 
pp. 285-289. -
SOibid., P• 288. -
51P. Costin, "Dopatism and the Retention of Psychological 
Misconceptions," Bducational and Psychological Measurement, 28 
(1968), pp. 529-534. --
52Ibid., P• S29. 
second. Closed-minded students showed "a greater resistance to 
changing specific false beliefs about human behavior -- beliefs 
which the investigator asstmled were more socially controversial 
and emotionally laden than the conventional principles of 
psychology* 1153 
19 
The Ehrlich and Lee (1969)54 sllDJ11ary of research in doglna-
tism and learning reports some additional experiments in dogma-
tism and classroom achievement which, taken, together, show very 
mixed results. Among them is a 1966 study by Rokeach and Norre1155 
~hich reports wide variation in the ability of the D Scale to 
predict academic achievement, depending on sex and academic major 
of subjects. Ehrlich and Lee interpret the findings to be highly 
suggestive of "the presence of uncontrolled intervening vari-
56 ables." 
Three studies which found a relatively uncomplicated 
inverse relationship between dogmAtism and learning are notable 
primarily because their subjects "t-ere not college students. 
Linton57 correlated low dogmatism to achievement in grade school, 
53Ibide 1 P• 533~ -
54Ehrlich and Lee, pp. 249-259. 
55Milton Rokeach, and G. Norrell, "The Nature of Analysis 
and Synthesis and Some Conditions in the Classroom which Facilitate 
or Retard These Co~itive Processes, 11 Final Report of Cooperative 
Research Branch Project No. 879, 1966, Michigan State University. 
56Ehrlich and Lee, p. 251. 
57Thomas E. Linton, "Dogmatism, Authority, and Academic 
Achievement," Alberta Journal of Educational Research, 14 (1) 
(1968), PP• 49-53. 
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Jacoby58 found low-dogmatic subjects more willing to accept 
innovative products among several types of manufactured items, 
and Joure, !!:_ !J!9 reported greater change in self concept 
following sensitivity group training among low-dogmatic subjects. 
The foregoing review suggests that a simple,,unqualified 
relationship between dogmatiaa and resistance to change is 
supported neither by Rokeach nor by research in dogmatism since 
1960. We shall now consider research into the area of dogmatiSDt 
and susceptibility to change. 
2. Literature!?!!. Do~atism ~Susceptibility~ Change. 
The research described above was in some sense oriented toward 
the expectation that dogmatism is inversely related to change. 
But basic dogmatism theory suggests a second, equally important 
area of investigation: that is the situation in which dogmatism 
and the likelihood or tendency to change are directly related. As 
we have seen, according to Rokeach's theory, new information from 
a highly authoritative source should produce greatest change among 
highly dogmatic persons. 
To investigate this prediction, Rokeach and his associates 
redesigned the Doodlebug problem in such a way that the new beliefs 
required for solution did not have to be discovered by subjects, 
but were given to them "on a silver platter. 11 In this experiment 
SB , 
3acob Jacoby, "Multiple-Indicant Approach for Studying 
New Product Adopters," 3ournal Applied Psychology, 54, No. 4 
(August, 1971), pp. 384-388. 
59Sylvia A. ;oure, Roland L. Frye, Barbara Meierhoeffer, 
and Robert N. Vidulich, "Diffemntial Change Among Sensitivity 
Training Participants as a Punotion of Dogmat:l.stll, 11 The Journal of 
Psychology, 80 (1972), PP• 151•156. - -
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closed-minded subjects actually solved the problem faster than 
open-minded subjects.60 The time difference was not statistically 
significant but was found consistently in replications of the 
experiment using different beliefs and solutions. The explanation 
offered is that in this silver platter mode for presenting new 
information closed-minded subjects do not have to remember the 
items since all three are presented at one time, thus their per-
formances are enhanced. Open-minded subjects are less willing to 
accept new information unquestioningly, hence the "silver-platter" 
mode does not improve their performance.61 
Incredibly, Rokeach's argument that closed-minded persons 
may be more subject to change or quicker to assimilate new infor-
mation is taken by some researchers as contrary to dogmatism 
theory! Bbrli'Ch and Lee (1969J, for example, open their article 
by saying: "A central proposition of Rokeach's theor:, ••• is that 
the cognitive system of closed persons is highly resistant to 
change. " 62 These same authors say later that the variable of 
authoritative message source is an "intervening variable" which 
may confound the experimental effects of dogmatism: 63 An experi-
mental study in which the experimenter was evidently surprised to 
find high-dogmatism correlated directly to persuasibility is that 
60Rokeach, :!l!!..22!:!!.!!!.<! c1osed ~t pp. 238-239. 
61~ •• pp. 212-213. 
62Ehrlich and lee, p. 249. 
63 i lb d., p. 255. -
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of Bostrom.64 Bostrom examined students' rating of speakers and 
response to messages. He found that dogmatism was unrelated to 
ratings assigned to speakers, but that there was greater agree-
ment with speakers' positions among dogmatic subjects. Bostrom 
did allude to the possibility that closed-minded subjects may be 
more persuasible, but concluded that such behavior was "illogical 
and inconsistent."65 No mention was made of whether the speakers 
in the study were perceived generally as highly authoritative 
sources. 
Yet another study, Vacchiano1 !l !!,,66 demonstrates 
unfamiliarity with the idea of susceptibility to change of highly-
dogmatic subjects. The authors report finding no significant 
correlation between dogmatism and effects of an intensive training 
session directed at changing subjects' attitudes about teaching. 
By way of explanation they suggest that the effect of the variable 
of authoritative source was counteracted by the presence of new 
information1 a possibility these authors evidently do not recognize 
as contrary to basic dog'lllatism theory. 
On the other hand, several studies have recognized suscepti-
bility to change in dogmatic subjects as integral to Rokeach's 
64aobert N. Bostrom, "Dogmatism, Rigidity, and Rating 
Behavior," Speech Teacher, XIII 1 No. 4 (November. 1964), pp. 283-287. 
65~ •• p. 287. 
66 R. B. Vacchiano, D. c. Schiffman, and A. Crowell, "Attitude 
Change as a Function of Intensive Training, Doginatism and Authori-
t8r:tanism1" Psychological Reports, 19 (1966), pp. 359-362. 
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model. Vidulich and !Kaiman67 studied the conformity behavior of 
subjects who responded to tight stimuli after an experimental 
confederate (identifie~ as high or low prestige source) had ver-
bally expressed an opinion as to direction of movement of the 
light. The study found a significant correlation between high 
dogmatismt high prestige source, and conformity behavior. The 
authors point to a "highly important inte.raction ••• between the 
variables of general authoritarianism (cognitive closedness) and 
information source status~"68 
Mertz, Miller, and Ballance69 subjected high- and low-
dogmatic subjects to messages incongruous with their beliefs but 
attributed to highly authoritative sources. It was predicted that 
attitude change toward the sources would be greater among open-
minded subjects (supported), but that attitude change toward the 
message concept would be greater among closed-minded subjects 
(supported to a limited degree). 
In 1968 Crano and Sigat70 offered experimental evidence 
suggesting that highly dogmatic subjects assimilated discrepant 
67R. N. Vidulich, and I. P. Kaiman, "The Effects of 
Information Source Status and Dogniatism Upon Conformity Behavior," 
Journal 2! Abnormal~ Social Psychology, 63 (1961), pp. 639-642. 
68~. 
69Robert J. Mertz, Gerald R. Miller, and Lee Ballance, 
"Open- and Closed-Mindedness and Cognitive Conflict," Journalism 
Quarterly. 43, No. 3 (1966) pp. 429-433, 485. , 
70wu1iam D. Crano, and Janet A. Sigal, "The Effect of 
Dogmatism Upon Pattern of Response to Attitudinally Discrepant 
Information, .. !!'!! Journal ,2! Social Psf!:hology, 75 (1968), 
pp. 241-247. 
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positions more readily than more open-minded subjects when the 
message source was presented as highly authoritative. They found 
slightly more change among low-dogmatic subjects in the direction 
advocated by a~ prestige source. The authors interpret their 
findings in terms of dissonance theory, suggesting that high-
dogmatic persons have a low tolerance for dissonance or perceived 
inconsistency. 
Centers, Shomer, and Rodrigues71 asked high- and low-
authoritarian subjects (as determined by a modified F Scale) to 
take a position on treatment of juvenile delinquents and then con-
fronted them with information in opposition to their stated posi-
tions attributed to authoritative sources. The greater shift in 
stated position observed among dogmatic subjects was explained as 
reflecting intolerance for "uncertainty. 1172 The authors put rather 
neatly the rationale for authoritarian susceptibility to change, 
noting itthe conception of the authoritarian as a person more 
dependant than the nonauthoritarian on external sources for defining 
reality and coping with its problems. 1173 
Two studies which do nothing to manipulate prestige of 
message source, but bear on tolerance of dissonance by highly 
dogmatic subjects are reported by Fillenbaum (1964)74 and Hunt and 
71Richard Centers, Robert William Shomer, and Arolodo 
Rodrigues, "A Field Experiment in Interpersonal Persuasion Using 
Authoritative Influence," Journal~ Personality, Vol. 38, No. 3, 
(September, 1970) pp. 392-403~ 
72~ •• p. 398. 
73tbid., p. 401. 
74s. PUtenbaum, "Do~atism and Individual Differences in 
Reduction of Dissonance," Psychological Reports, 14 (1964), pp. 47-SO. 
Miller (1968). 75 Both studies indicate that dogmatic subjects 
are highly susceptible to change when they agree to prepare 
messages in defense of a position opposed to one they have 
espoused. In both cases, the dissonance model is employed to 
explain the results. 
2S 
It is also in this area of effect of highly authoritative 
sources that Rokeacb's dogmatism theory has had one of its moat 
serious challenges. Recall Rokeach's rationale for "party-line" 
thinking. Dogmatic subjects, Rokeach asserts, are more susceptible 
to change when the new beliefs come from an authoritative source. 
His argument is that the experiment using the silver-platter mode 
of presentation is "analogous" to the presentation of new beliefs 
by a high authority figure. But he wants to say also that what 
the silver-platter eXl)eriment overcomes is the closed-minded 
person's tendency!!!?! E?_ remember the new beliefs. Rokeach's use 
of memory in this explanation ia speculative and (very signifi-
cantly) does not rule out the possibility that a dogmatic person's 
memory for new beliefs might be poor regardless of the prestige of 
the source. In other words, if memory is a variable in the per-
suasibility of dogmatic persons, it may be that what .llokeach's 
silver-platter experiment showed was not that dogmatic subjects 
are highly susceptible to new beliefs from high prestige sources, 
but precisely that dogmatic subjects have poorer memories for new 
beliefs! It is this possibility that has subjected dogmatism 
?SM. F. Hunt, and G. a. Miller, t10pen- and Ctosed-Mindedness, 
Belief-Discrepant Communication Behavior, and Tolerance for Cognitive 
Inconsistency," J'ournal !?£_Personality!!!.! Social Psychology, 8, 
(1968), pp. 35-37. 
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theory to one of its directest and most serious challenges. 'Two 
studies have raised the question of whether McGuire•s76 view of 
persuasibility may not call into question any generalized trait 
of authoritarianism as a significant factor in persuasion. 
McGuire's position is that several processes act as variables in 
producing general persuasibility• interacting to produce an out-
come not necessarily explained by examining one process alone. He 
argues that at least two of these processes are at work in every 
persuasive situation: comprehension of the message (including 
attention and perception) and the willingness to yield to what is 
received. 
Johnson, Torcivia, and Poprick77 have suggested that 
McGuire's formulation conflicts with the idea that highly-
authoritarian subjects are "source-oriented" or highly susceptible 
to change advocated by high-prestige message sources. They cite 
evidence that whereas authoritariani• (as measured by the P Scale) 
and yielding are related directly, authoritarianism and compre-
hension are inversely related. 
Accordingly, these investigators hypothesize that the point 
at which the comprehension and yielding components intersect to 
produce maximum perauasibility will be at a relatively low or 
76William J. McGuire, "Personality and Susceptibility to 
Social Influence," in E. P. Borgatta and W., W. Lambert (editors) 
Handbook 2£. Personality Theorl Research, (Chicago: Rand 
McNally, 1968), PP• 1130-1187. 
77Homer H. Johnson, James M. Torcivia, Mary Ann Poprick, 
"Effects of Source Credibility on the Relationship Between 1 
Authoritarianism and Attitude Change, 1• Journal of Personality and 
Social PSJChOlogy. 9, No. 2, PP• 179-183. - -
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moderate level of authoritarianism even when the message comes 
from a highly authoritative sourcee To test this hypothesis, 
they attributed messages opposed to frequent toothbrushing and 
x-ray detection of Tuberculosis to both high and low credible 
sources. The resu2 ts shuued that the lev·el of source credibility 
produced little difference in net persuasive effect on highly 
authoritarian subjects. As predicted, low F-scorers showed 
greatest differential response to messages from high versus low 
credible S{)Urces. The authors suggest that the idea of low 
authoritarians relying on authority may have relevance primarily 
to situations in which a highly credible source is identified 
"th d i f • 78 w1 pressures towar soc al con ormLty~ 
The findings of Johnson, Torcivia, and Poprick were 
I 
extended subsequently by Johnson and lzzett. 79 They suggested that 
ease of message comprehension may have intervened in the earlier 
study. Noting that a difficult or ambiguous message may have 
masked the effect of authoritarian source-orientation, these authors 
compared four levels of authoritarianism (measured by the F Scale), 
high and low source credibility, and two levels of the yielding 
component indicated by plausible and implausible or unsupported mes-
sages. All messages were judged to be easily comprehensible. The 
results showed interaction between source credibility and authori-
78!!?!.!!,., p. 182. 
79Homer H. Johnson, and Richard R. lzzett, "Relationship 
Between Authoritarianism and Attitude Change As A Function of Source 
Credibility and Type of Communication," Journal _2f Personality 
Social Psychology, 13, No. 4, pp. 317-321. 
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tarianism to be that suggested by the ~Guire model. Low authori-
tarians responded more to highly credible sources than high authori-
tarians, just as in the previous study. The authors conclude 
their discussion by suggesting that in studies which do show high 
authoritarians changing more in response to high prestige sources, 
difficulty of message comprehension may need to be taken into con-
sideration. 
While these experiments deal with authoritarianism aa 
measured by the F Scale, they must be seen as questioning the view 
of dogmatic persons being susceptible to change when advocated by 
highly credible sources. I have already argued that some criticism 
and questions about authoritarianism are applicable to dogmatism 
theory as well, and in this case, the serious question of suscepti-
bility to change appears highly relevant to both authoritarianism and 
dogmatism. 
3. Literature Dogmatism, Change, "Intervening Variables." 
A final area of study relating to dogn,.atism and learning which has 
interested researchers is that having to do with comparison of what 
Ehrlich and Lee (1969) call "intervening variables, 1180 or additional 
factors which may interact with dogmatism to produce a net persuasi-
bil ity effect. 
Among the earliest researchers interested in this area were 
Pillenbaum and Jackman81 who confirmed Rokeach's findings that low-
80Ehrlich and lee, PP• 253 ff. 
81s. Fillenbaum, and A • .Jackman, "Dogtnatism and Anxiety in 
Relation to Problem Solving: An Extension of Rokeach 1 s Results 1 " 
Journal 2£. Abnormal!!!! Social Psychology, 63 (1961), pp. 212-214. 
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doglllatic subjects are more efficient problem solvers, and looked 
for, but found no evidence that anxiety (as measured by selected 
questions from the MMPI) was correlated with dogmatism or problem 
solving ability. 
Zagona and Zurcher82 raise the question of whether intelli-
gence may not be a variable which both correlates with and confounds 
the experimental effects of dogmatism. The authors compar~d high-
and low-dogmatic students enrolled in a freshman psychology course, 
administering written intelligence and personality tests, and 
observing students 9 communication behavior, ability to deal with the 
essence of theoretical issues, willingness to contribute to classroom 
discusaiono 
The authors point to significant correlations of low dogma-
tism scores with a verbal ability test and performance on the mid-
term examination. They were "struck" by differences they "detected" 
in student interaction and participation and 0 scholastic performance. 1183 
They poin~ to correlations Rokeach found between doglnatism and the 
American Council on Education test of intelligence; correlations not 
generally at a statistically significant level, but showing, the 
authors believe, a trend which questions whether dogmatism and intelli-
gence are not related. 
This study is one of the first to question whether scores on 
dogtnatism scales are actually produced largely or in part by some 
82s. v. Zagona and L. A. Zurcher, "The Relationship of Verbal 
Ability and Other Cognitive Variables to the Open-Closed Cognitive 
Dimensionp" .Journal !?£. Psychology, 60 (1965), PP• 213-219. 
83tbid., p. 215. 
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other variable. But the authors' 11conviction" that intelligence 
is that variable stems only partially from correlations with a 
test measuring "factors generally associated with intelligence." 
It comes primarily from their observations of student behavior in 
class settings; however Zagona and Zurcher offer no assurance that 
their expectations of the high-dogmatic section did not influence 
both student performance and their appraisal of it. Moreover, 
virtually every characteristic of student behavior cited as an 
example of relatively high or low intelligence (ability to relate 
to other students and the professor, ability to grasp the "core" 
of various issues, willingness to participate in discussions) can be 
explained in terms of dogmatism theory. 
Most important in any assessment of this critique of dogma-
tism theory is Zagona and Zurcher's claim that Rokeach holds dogv;.a-
tism and intelligence to be unrelated. Precisely the opposite is 
the case. Rokeach says: "It seems to us that we!!.!_ (emphasis 
added) dealing here with intelligence, although not with the kind 
of intelligence measured by current intelligence tests. 1184 He 
indicates further that dogmatism theory may suggest some new dimen-
sions of intelligence not currently measured by tests such as the ACE. 
Thus, Zagona and Zurcher's criticism, missing Rokeach's 
central point regarding intelligence, offers only a correlation 
between dogmatism and three tests, only one of which possesses any 
standardization or reliability data.85 The interplay of dogmatism 
84 Rokeach, !!!!_ !!.<!, Ctosed ~' p. 407. 
85 Zagona and Zurcher, pp. 215-2160 
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and intelligence is definitely an important subject to pursue, but 
it remains to be shown that the two variables are essentially 
I 
different and at odds. This study suggests an "intervening" 
variable which might confound the e::xperimental effects of dogmatism, 
but the questions it raises have already been anticipated and 
addressed by basic dogmatism theory. 
Another possible variable intervening in studies of dogma-
tism may be belief-congruence. Adams and Vidulich86 presented high-
and low-dogmatic subjects with a learning task requiring the associa-
tion of word pairs .. Some pairs were congruent (i.e .. , "mom-mother"), 
while others were incongruent (i.e.,, "poor-rich"). High-dogmatic 
subjects had grester difficulty remembering incongruent pairs than 
low-dogmatic subjects. Another study which addresses the point of 
87 belief-congruence and dogmatism is that of Kleck and Wheaton. 
They, however, found no greater preference for belief-congruent 
beliefs among dogmatic subjects than non-dogmatic subjects. Dogmatic 
subjects showed less ability to remember belief-incongruent informa-
tion, but nothing was found to question or elaborate on basic dogma-
tism theory,. 
Another possible vaclnble was suggested by Pyron and Kafer88 
86u. 'E. Adams, and R., N. Vidulich, "Dogmatism and Belief 
Congruence in Paired-Associate Learning," Psychological Reports, 
10 (1962), pp. 91-94. 
87R. E. Kleck and J. Wheaton, "Dogmatism and Responses to 
Opinion-Consistent and Opinion-Inconsistent Information," Journal of 
Personality~ Social Psychology, 5 (1967), pp. 249-252. 
88B. Pyron, and 3. Kafer, ••Recall of Nonsense and Attitudinal 
Rigidity, .. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, s, (1967), 
pp .. 463-466. - -
32 
in a study which( identified the element of uinterest." Nonsense 
statements judged to be either interesting or uninteresting were 
submitted to subjects. Low-dogmatic subjects were found better at 
recalling the interesting statements. Highly dogmatic subjects 
remembered interesting and uninteresting statements equally well. 
Whereas the above studies seem to offer limited insight 
into dogmatism theory, there is one additional variable which has 
received more attention and could prove to be important in an assess-
ment of dogmatism and learning. For our present purposes, I shall 
call this variable 0 belief strength." This category includes both 
"involvement" and ucentrality" of belief, treated as separate 
variables in the Ehrlich and Lee (1969) survey. 
In .Rokeach 9 s The 21?!.! !!!2_ Closed~ (1960) the question 
of centrality of beliefs has to do primarily with the location of 
beliefs along the "central-peripheral dimension. 1189 For Rokeach, 
centrality of beliefs is a question of whether the belief is a core 
belief about the nature of the world and the self, an intermediate 
belief about authority and the individual's relation to that 
authority, or a peripheral belief wh{ch flows from the central and 
peripheral regions and concerns specific ideas, issues, and objects 
in one's environment. 
It is true, moreover, that Rokeach sees central beliefs aa 
less susceptible to change than peripheral. In his book Beliefs, 
90 Attitudes.!.!!!, Values (1970) he reports a study by Rokeach, Reyher, 
89Rokeach, !!!!, 22!!!..!!!! Closed~• PP• 38-51. 
90 
Milton Rokeach, Beliefs, Attitudes,~ Values, (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1968) 
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91 and Wiseman which tested susceptibility to change of beliefs in 
five categories: (a) primitive beliefs which are axiomatically 
true ("unanimous concensus"), (b) primitive beliefs for which 
external verification is impossible ("zero consensus"), (c) authority 
beliefs about reference persons or reference groups, (d) beliefs 
"concerning matters of fact" which emanate from an authoritative 
source, and (e) inconsequential beliefs about questions of taste or 
arbitrary opinion. It should be noted that this is a refinement of 
the central-intermediate-peripheral dimension, with (a) and (b) 
representing central beliefs, (c) representing intermediate beliefs, 
and (d) and (e) completing the peripheral belief category. 92 Rokeach 
and associates found evidence to indicate that the more centrally 
located the belief in this conceptualization, the less susceptible to 
change it would be. 
But what may be most significant in this instance is what 
Rokeach does not claim: the study attempts to hold intensity of 
beliefs constant so as not to be a variable. Rokeach is specific in -
excluding any consideration of varying intensity of peripheral 
beliefs. Yet it is this intensity of beliefs that Ehrlich and Lee 
evidently refer to when they report research on "centrality of 
beliefs. 1193 In doing so they use the term "important" as equivalent 
91Milton Rokeach, J. Reyher, and a. Wiseman, "An Experimental 
Analysis of The Organization of Belief Systeu. In Milton Rokeach, 
Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 
1968), pp. 22 ff. -
92.!2!!!,., PP• 6-12. 
93.!!?!!., PP• 12-13. 
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to "central." and summarize studies which refer to belief strength 
or intensity or identify centrality with personal involvement and 
belief congruence.94 Thus, these authors and others who have 
addressed the question of "centrality" are talking about intensity 
of beliefs within the peripheral region. Whereas this concern may 
be an important one in assessing the role of dogm.~tism in learning, 
it is not the concern to which ltokeach has addressed himself., 
Some studies do raise the question of belief strength or 
intensity in relation to dogJ:n.atism and learning. Ladd95 studied 
concept learning abLlity of subjects in a task involving sorting 
cards according to shape 0 color, and number, an adaptation of the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. Subjects were required to sort cards 
into correct categories and were told at each selection whether the 
choice was right or wrong. No correlation was found between dogma-
tism and ability to perform the task correctly. Ehrlich and Lee 
(1969) interpret the findings as showing that "belief-neutral and 
presumably non-involving materials096 explain the lack of difference 
between high- and low-dogmatic subjects. This is not claimed by 
Ladd himself, nor does his report of the experiment provide explicit 
rationale for such a conclusiona 
Hypothesizing that high issue involvement and high dogmatism 
would produce minimal change, that low dog'Olatism and low involvement 
94 Ehrlich and Lee, p. 256. 
9S P. E. Ladd, "Concept Leaming in Relation to Open- and 
Closed-Mindedness and Academic Aptitude, "''Psychological Reports, 
20, (1967), pp. 135-142. 
96 Ehrlich and Lee, P• 252 0 
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would produce maximal change, and that ttintermediate" change would 
result from "the two high and low combinations of each," Miller97 
induced varying levels of involvement on the issue o~ fluoridation 
and measured change after presentation of discrepant messages. 
Involvement was achi~ved by eliciting subjects' commitment to a 
mail campaign in favor of their stated position on fluoridation. 
Subjects were "allowed" to hear tapes of "interviews" in which 
their position was ar~ued against, and then were tested again as 
to their position on the relevant issue. 
The results confirmed Miller's hypothesis, but no significant 
interaction of experimental effects with dogtnatism: it "scarcely had 
an effect on attitude change. "98 Miller further points to the fact 
that subjects were among the upper and lower quartiles of doglllatism 
chosen from a population of BOO, suggesting that the failure of dogma-
tism to produce significant effects is even more notable in this light. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The research which has been done in these areas does not 
represent a complete investigation of possible variables in the-• 
interaction of dogmatism and learning. But the questions raised by 
such research as that of Johnson, Torcivia and Poprick (1968) and 
Johnson and lzzett (1969) on the reliance of highly dogmatic subjects 
on authority, and Miller (1965) on the interaction of dogmatism and 
involvement. seem to warrant the suggestion by Ehrlich and Lee (1969) 
97N. Miller, 11 Involvement and Dogmatism as Inhibitors of 
Attitude Change," .Journal Experimental Social Psychology, 1 (1965), 
pp. 121-132. 
98Ibid., p. 131. -
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that further study of dogmatism needs to examine several possible 
intervening variables. They suggest authoritativeness of source, 
syndrome relevance (whether new beliefs are presented together or 
one-by-one), congruence of new beliefs, novelty of new beliefs, and 
"centrality" (or as we have sugp;ested, strength or intensity) of 
beliefs.99 
99Bhrlich and Lee, p. 258. 
III: RATIONALE, HYPOTHESES, PROCEDURES !Q! STUDY 
A. RATIONALE 
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Of all the unanswered questions raised by the foregoing 
examination of literature on dogmatism. the challenge which seems 
most direct is that of the McGuire model as utilized by Johnson, 
Torcivia, and Poprick (1968) and Johnson and Izzett (1969). The 
lines are clearly drawn: Rokeach (1960) predicts that authoritarian 
or dogmatic people will be more likely to absorb new information from 
highly authoritative sources; !,i:Guire predicts that persons of medium 
to low authoritarianism are more likely to remember the new beliefs 
or attitudes. 
As we have seen, the key to resolving these contrary predic-
tions is in the concept of "comprehension" or recall. M::Guire argues 
that high authoritarians are not more persuasible because, even though 
they have a tendency to yield to high prestige sources, they are less 
able to comprehend the message. Rokeach, we have noted, ran a belief-
synthesizing experiment in which he argued that closed-minded subjects 
solved the "Doodlebug" problem faster than more open-minded subjects 
because the new beliefs required for solution had been presented all 
at once, "on a silver platter.tt He argued that this wae analogous to 
new information coming from a prestigious source, but said also that 
the key to the dogmatic subjects• quicker solution was that they 
remembered the beliefs better when presented all at once. I have 
suggested that this variable memory is the precise point at which 
the Rokeach model is vulnerable to 1110dification by ~Guire. The 
McGuire model says in effect that Rokeach is more nearly correct than 
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he realizes: it is precisely the dogmatic subjects' inabiJity to 
remember new information that the "silver platter" mode of presenta-
tion overcomes, thus proving that dogmatic/authoritarian persons 
have relatively poor memories for new beliefs, not that they are 
likelier to yield to positive authority sources. 
Let us compare the Rokeach and McGuire models succinctly. 
First, both incorporate "yielding" in the sense that both models 
assume a tendency for dogmatic persons to yield to p~rsuasion and 
new information from high authority sources. Second, both recognize 
that memory or comprehension is a factor. But where the McGuire 
conceptualization sees comprehension or recall as a separate variable, 
Rokeach does not really want to view it as a variable. He treats it 
instead as analogous to the variable of source authoritativeness. The 
key question becomes whether memory operates as a variable independent 
of and in opposition to the effects of source authoritativeness. The 
M::Guire model argues "yes; 0 Rokeach assumes "no ... 
The Johnson, Torcivia, and Poprick study~ however, did not 
demonstrate that the less efficient memory of authoritarian subjects 
is, in fact, the variable which works against the dimension of 
"yielding." The study did show that highly authoritarian subjects 
who were subjected to a persuasive appeal were less persuasible and 
remembered less than low authoritarians. The interpretation the 
authors gave was that there was an inverse correlation between high 
authoritarianism and ability to recall or comprehend. But a key 
distinction which 3ohnson, Torcivia, and Poprick did not make, yet 
seem to have assumed is the distinction between ability to remember 
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as a separate dimension, and willingness to remember, which may be 
only an aspect of the dimension of yielding. In other words, the 
findings of the above study may show only that highly authoritarian 
subjects are unwilling to yield to new information, and that as part 
of their refusal to yield those subjects refuse to retain the new 
information in memory. This is to say ~hat ~heir less efficient 
recali was just an aspect of their tendency not to yield. Such an 
interpretation would deny that comprehension is a separate dimension, 
operating independently of yielding, as Johnson, Torcivia, and 
Poprick claim. 
We still do not know, then, whether comprehension is a 
variable or dimension which operates, as the McGuire model suggests, 
independently of the yielding dimension. That is the question this 
study seeks to answer. 
B. HYPOTHESES 
This study will attempt to confirm one of the conflicting 
predictions of Rokeach and ~Guire in regard to comprehension. 
Specifically: 
1. The Rokeach model predicts that highly dogmatic persons 
will absorb new beliefs from an authoritative source more efficiently 
' 
than open-minded persons. If this experiment demonstrates a positive 
relationship between dogmatism and comprehensiont such results would 
indicate support for the Rokeach model. 
2. The McGuire model predicts that highly dogmatic persons 
will absorb new beliefs from an authoritative source less efficiently 
than open-minded persons. A significant negative corr:elation in this 
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experiment between dogmatism scores and comprehension would argue for 
the McGuire conceptualization. 
C. PROCEDURE 
In order to support one of the above models 1 it seems neces-
sary for an experimental study to do several things: 
1. Present a message which: 
a. is attributed to a highly authoritative source. 
b. contains new information, likely to be unfamiliar 
to subjects. 
c. avoids the yielding dimension as much as possible 
by emphasizing factual, informative content not 
requiring agreement or disagreement. 
2. Test for comprehension (recall) of factual materials 
from the messages 
3. Ask subjects to assess authoritativeness of the source. 
4. Identify levels of dogmatism in subjects. 
An experiment was designed to satisfy these criteria. A 
message was adapted from "Science and Fiction, ,.lOO a short article 
by Walter Sullivan on the development of science fiction literature. 
It was attributed to "Prof. Erik M. J'ohnson 1 Professor of Science 
and Humanities at Northwestern University, and amateur authority on 
Science Fiction." The message was presented to subjects as having 
been excerpted from a series of lectures that "Prof. Johnson" was 
invited to deliver on the B.B.c. in London. The message had actually 
lOOwalter Sullivan, "Science and Fiction" in 
Times Encyclopedic A1manac 1 1971, pp. 449-4.50. 
been recorded by a radio newsman at a location distant enough 
from the location of the experiment that it seemed unlikely his 
voice would be recognized. 
The message was attributed to a highly authoritative 
sourcea It appeared to contain material which was likely to be 
new to most subjects. And the message is almost exclusively 
"factual:" it does not seek responses along a "yielding" or 
agree-disagree dimension, but asks subjects to respond as to 
"comprehension" or recall. A complete text of the message used 
is included in Append.ix "A." 
The test of comprehension can be found in Appendix 11B." 
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It consisted of twenty multiple-choice questions which were designed 
to cover all significant factual points of the message. All alternate 
answers were taken from something said in the text of the message, 
with only one answer being the correct choice for each question. In 
addition to the test questionnaire, each subject was asked to rate 
the authoritativeness of "Prof. Johnson" by placing an "X" on a con-
tinuum from "not very authoritative" to "highly authoritative." 
Finally, the subjects completed the E scale, a shorter version of 
the Dogmatism scale (D scale) as abridged by Rokeach and his associ-
ates (see Appendix "C,.). 
This test of message comprehension and dogmatism was intro-
duced to subjects by the experimenter thanking the subjects for 
participating in the study. The experimenter then said: 
"In this study we are interested in your 
reactions to a talk which was made by Prof. Erik M. 
Johnson, professor of Science and Humanities at 
Northwestern University and amateur expert on 
Science-Fiction literature. We shall listen to a 
recording excerpted from a lecture Dr. Johnson made. 
on invitation of the B.B.c. in London, and then I'll 
ask you to complete a questionnaire indicating your 
responses. Pirst, let's listen to the recording." 
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"Dr. Johnson's" qualifications were repeated on the tape, 
and the message followed. 
IV: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS -----
The dogmatism-comprehension experiment was submitted to 
three groups of subjects in the Spring of 1973. 
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Correlations were calculated between dogmatism scores and 
comprehension (recall), dogmatism and rating of source authorita-
tiveness, and comprehension and authoritativeness rating of message 
source using the Pearson "R" formula for correlation of paired 
data. In addition, the standard deviation for subjects' rating of 
authoritativeness of the message was calculated. The following 
table summarizes findings; 
Group 
Group Size E/C A.R. - s.o. B/A C/A 
A 13 -.567 75.39 16.00 +.332 +.058 
B 8 -.785 67.00 19.17 +.637 -.322 
C 34 -.310 74.82 14.40 +.134 -.111 
Combined 55 -.421 73.82 15.81 +.254 -.069 
Groups 
Key: B/C - Correlation between dogmatism (the "E" scale) and 
comprehension. 
A.R. - Mean authoritativeness rating of message source. 
"Highly Authoritative"= 100. 
s.D. - Standard Deviation. 
E/A - Correlation between dogmatism and authoritativeness 
rating of message source. 
C/A - Correlation between comprehension and authoritative-
ness rating of message source. 
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Group "A" was composed of undergraduates at Southwestern 
College, Winfield, ltansaa in an upperclass Economics course. The 
correlationcbetween dogmatism and comprehension of -.567 is signi-
ficant at the .os level. 
Group "B" consisted of employees of the Mossman Guitar 
Company in Winfield, Kansas. All of these subjects had completed 
some college study9 but none had been graduated. The -.78S correla-
tion between dogmatism and comprehension is significant at the .01 
level. 
Group "C" consisted of high school students attending a 
speech and debate camp at The University of Kansas. The -.310 
correlation obtained between dogmatism and comprehension achieves a 
level of significance of .01. 
Taken as a whole, the 55 subjects showed a correlation of 
-.421 between dogmatism and comprehension scores, a result which is 
significant at the .01 level. The mean authoritativeness rating of 
the message source by the combined groups was 73.82 with a Standard 
Deviation of 15.81. To insure that the correlation between dogmatism 
and comprehension was not a result of subjects perception of authori-
tativeness of the message source, this latter variable was factored 
out, producing a partial correlation between dogmatism and compre-
hension of -.416.for the combined groups, significant at the .01 level. 
These results seem to suggest that subjects were convinced to 
a fairly high degree of the source's authoritativeness, and that to a 
significant degree, dogmatism and comprehension were inversely related. 
DISCUSSION 
Whereas both Rokeach and subsequent researchers have 
alluded to comprehension or recall as a dimension in persuasibility 
and absorption of new information, the literature (as we have already 
seen) has not demonstrated that comprehension or recall is variable 
distinct from the yielding dimension and interacting with it. The 
previous research has mentioned or measured recall, but only in terms 
of its interaction with the net effect of persuasibility or learning 
which includes the yielding dimension. In this study I have sought 
to isolate the dimension of comprehension to determine whether it is 
in fact a distinct variable as Rokeach has hinted and as Johnson, 
Torcivia, and Poprick (1968), and Johnson and lzzett (1969) have 
asserted. 
The results of this experiment seem to indicate that this 
dimension of recall or comprehension does operate independently of 
the yielding dimension, and varies with levels of dogmatism. Highly 
dogmatic subjects are significantly less likely to recall new infor-
mation than open-minded subjects. The authoritativeness of the 
source to which the message was attributed was rated generally high 
by subjects. These findings argue against the Rokeach model's pre-
diction that recall would be most efficient among dogmatic subjects. 
The results of this study agree with the prediction of the McGuire 
model that highly authoritarian subjects comprehend less than low 
authoritarians. 
These results raise some serious questions about the Rokeach 
model of dog'lnati• and its ability to make predictions about human 
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behavior from the "personality variable" of dogmatism* To be sure, 
there is nothing in.this study which denies that dogmatic persons 
resist change advocated by sources of low authority or sources 
perceived to be in conflict with the dogmatic person°s positive 
authority figures. But Rokeach insists that the dogmatism concept 
will go further and explain "party-line thinking" and the yielding 
to positive authority figures of authoritarian peraonso These 
findings are contrary to Rokeach's expectations. 
The results of this study appear to argue that memory or 
comprehension functions not as an analogy to the variable of high 
prestige source 9 as R.okeach speculated, but as a distinct variableo 
'l'he findings suggest that the effects of memory are independent of 
source prestige; more dogntatic subjects comprehended less of the 
information from a prestigious, authoritative source than open 
subjects. In other words, the dogmatic subjects' less efficient 
recall of ~ew information was not overcome by high prestige of the 
source~ 
But what of the Rokeach problem-solving experiment? We can 
argue that Rokeach's experiment actually supported the McGuire model 
and this study. Th.e Doodlebug experiment presented the new beliefs 
to the subjects all at once in written form, making it virtually 
impossible for subjects~ !2_ remembe~; the variable of recall was 
systematically eliminated. 
A similar explanation could be offered regarding Rokeach's 
example of party-line thinking10l in which Western Communists very 
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suddenly changed their minds about the propriety of collaboration 
with Nazis after the 1939 Stalin-Hitler pact. He notes that their 
reasons for the change were vague until they received the next issue 
of !!!!. Party Worker which provided them with "reasons" for their 
sudden about-face. Again, there was no opportunity for the variable 
of comprehension to operate. It would have been difficult for these 
persons not to remember a single fact which was by then part general 
public knowledge and discussion. I would suggest further that this 
is not really a typical example of "party-line thinking" as Rokeach 
went on to define it. Party-line thinking is a pattern of thought 
in which contradictory beliefs may be held simultaneously because 
they are isolated in the "peripheral" belief area., And it seems to 
follow that they are inferentially contradictory beliefs whose 
inferential connection can be ignored, thus isolating them from one 
another and making it possible to hold to them simultaneously. 
Rokeach's example, however, is one where a belief was immediately 
replaced by its opposite: the ~tmnunists did not hold "A" and "not A" 
simultaneously because they were not confronted with inferentially 
contradictory beliefs, but with a direct denial of the belief already 
held. In this example neither ~he comvrehenaion variable nor the 
party-line thinking Rokeach described was present. 
To say that dogmatic persons remember or comprehend less and 
are thus unable to yield to information or appeals frcm high prestige 
sources does not quite eliminate the concept of party-line thinking as 
a valid adjunct of dogt1atism theory. It allows for the possibility 
that dogmatic persons may "go along" when their authority figures 
contradict or modify a belief already held by addressing that 
belief directly as we have seen ln Rokeach's examplee But the 
much broader conceptualization of party-line thinking in which 
dogmatic subjects are seen as more persuasible because they 
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tend to yield to anything a high authority source suggests see.ms 
to be denied by the findings of this study. 
CONCLUSION 
This study has attempted to isolate the variable of compre-
hension or recall and to determine experimentally if this variable 
is (a) independent of the yielding dimension of persuasive appeals 
and (b) correlated negatively with increasing levels of dogmatism 
as suggested by ¥~Guire and subsequent researchers. The findings 
argue that comprehension is independent of yielding, and that a 
negative correlation between comprehension and dogmatism argues 
for ~he McGuire model with its view of greater persuasibility among 
moderately authoritarian persons and against the Rokeach model with 
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SCIENCE FICTION AND THE PROSPECT FOR MAN -- --
Science fiction has traditionally been an escape from 
reality, a dream of what might be, rather than a confrontation with 
what is. But with the landing of men on the Moon, the implantation 
of animal organs in human beings, the development of ray guns, and 
in countless other ways, science has overtaken science fiction.' 
Yet as one matches the accomplishnents of today with the predictions 
of a century or more ago, it is remarkable to what an extent the 
seemingly fantastic of earlier generations is the fact of todayo 
As Columbus prepared for his first voyage to the New World 
one of the earliest accounts of a Moon journey was published. It 
was by the satirist Lucian, who, in fact, wrote two tales of llion 
journeys, one in a ship caught up by a whirlwind, the other by a 
man who armed himself with wings (one from a vulture and the other 
from an eagle)., After much practice, when he was "a chicken no 
longer," he took off into the sky. 
Another s~-ch fanciful tale was that of Cyrano de Bergerac, 
who told how he visited the Moon and was put on display there as 
a freak. These accounts, however, were essentially satires. There 
was little, if any, science in them. It was the scientific revolu-
tion of the seventeenth century that gave birth to true science 
'fiction, a prime example being Francis Godwin's Man in the Moone: 
.2E, ~Discourse£!,! Voyage Thither by Domingo Goiisales, published in 
1638. 
According to Marjorie 'Ebpe Nicolson, an authority on such 
writings. this book inspired both Robinson Crusoe and Gulliver's 
Travels. The Godwin book's hero, an island castaway, made his 
escape by training wild swans on the island to lift a harness and 
himselfs He discovered, however, that the birds hibernated on the 
Moon. The author described how, during the journey, the birds and 
their passenger gradually slipped into the sphere where lunar gravity 
predominates -- a phenomenon that has been experienced on every M:>on 
journey of the Apollo astronauts. 
It is, however, Jules Verne's account of a Moon journey that 
has been most dramatically fulfilled. Verne saw the journey as a 
triuuph of American military technology (with a giant cannon. rather 
than rockets). The chosen launching site was in Florida (across the 
peninsula from Cape Kennedy). Trajectory calculations were by an 
observatory in Cambridge, Massachusetts -- home today of the 
Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, which followed the flight of 
Apollo spacecraft toward the Moone 
The projectile was equipped with retrorockets and these, 
like the SPS (or Service Propulsion System) engine of the Apollo 
craft, were used to boost the vehicle out of lunar orbit and back 
toward Earth. Like all Apollo flights to date, that of Jules Verne 
splashed down in the Pacific and was picked up by a u.s. naval vessel. 
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It is hard to believe that the wonders of the laser and of 
relativity could have been anticipated as early as the 1890's, but 
this was in part true in the works of H. G. Wells. The Time Machine 
tells of a man who, having fathomed the nature of ti.me, builds a 
device that can look ahead (or backward) in time. 
The book was written at a time when scientists were ponder-
ing the paradoxes involving such relationships as motion through 
space and time. Ten years later Albert Einstein resolved the diffi-
culties with a theory of relativity that many still find as hard to 
believe as Wells' time machine. It proposes that if an astronaut is 
travelling close to the speed of light, time aboard the spacecraft 
will, from the viewpoint of a stationary observer, almost come to a 
halt, even though to the astronaut the passage of time seems normal. 
Recent observations in high-energy physics, in which particles 
move at such high speeds, have confirmed this theory in a variety of 
ways, and astronauts who spend a week or so spinning around Earth c011e 
home a fraction of a second younger than they would have been had they 
stayed at home. 
The preoccupation of H. G. Wells with such matters is also 
reflected in his 1899 book, Tales 2£. Space~!!!!.• Two years later 
he added to the growing list of fictitious Moon journeys with his 
The First Men in the Moon. However it was in his bone-chilling 
Tiie' War of"tiie--W-Orici's""'cie9B) that he told of interplanetary travel 
a"Martfaninvasion -- and the use of a ray gun,the beam of which was 
so intense that it set on fire anything in its way - people, forests, 
and homes. 
Somewhat similar ray guns served as weapons in the Buck 
Rogers and Plash Gordon comic strips, and one still sees them in 
television serials. Today, however, they exist in the form of laser 
beams. 
Such a beam, in the infrared, can be invisible. It can be 
used surgically as a cutting tool, or across vast reaches of space 
to measure distances (accurate within a few inches) to a reflector 
left by astronauts on the Moon. 
Today human kidneys have been transplanted from person to 
person, as well as hearts, lungs, livers, and bone marrow. In a few 
cases such organs have been taken from animals (chimpanzees, baboons, 
and pigs) for use in human beings, so far with little success, 
although it is hoped that the body's defenses against invasion (which 
reject such transplants) can eventually be controlled. 
Even more routine is the replacement of damaged blood vessels 
and heart valves with factory-made substitutes and cont'rol of the 
heartbeat with man-made pacemakers. Furthermore the brains of monkeys 
have been removed and kept alive, independently, the brain responding 
to electrical stimuli in a manner reminiscent of'the science fiction 
tale Donovan's Brain. 
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It is hard to believe that when Lord Byron, Percy Bysse 
Shelley, and his wife Mary discussed the possible construction of 
a human being, early in the last century, they had such develop-
ments in mind. 
Nevertheless in the book that resulted -- perhaps the most 
hair-raising in all science fiction -- Mary Shelley tells how her 
wretched hero, Victor Frankenstein, haunted dissecting rooms to 
obtain parts for the monster that was his ultimate undoing. 
Some of the most recent studies in embryonic development 
have also produced monsters of a sort. Known as chimeras (for the 
mythical beast that was part lion, part goat 9 and part snake), they 
are formed by combining the embryonic cells of two different species 
at the earliest stage of developmento The resulting individual 
displays features of both species. 
Some of today 1 s science fiction writers, such as Ray 
Bradbury, are telling us, as did Es M. Forster a generation ago, 
not just of future technological developments, but their possible 
consequences for survival of the human spirit and a 1 ivable world-. 
If their warnings are heeded, we may yet avert the fate of their 
unfortunate protagonists. 
(excerpted from Walter Sullivan: "Science and Fictionu in 





Please complete the following statements by circling the letter of 
the answer which seems to you closest to what Dr. Johnson actually 
said in his talk. 
1. The fanciful tale of visiting the moon and being displayed there 
as a Freak was told by: 
a,. Don J'uan 
b. Cyrano de Bergerac 
c. Don Quixote 
d. Casanova 
2. True Science Fiction arose at the time of: 
a. Man landing on the Moon 
b. The industrial revolution 
c. Increased wealth and leisure time 
d. The scientific revolution of the seventeenth century 
3. Dr. Johnson points out that the original creator of Frankenstein 
was the wife of the poet: 




4. Francis Godwin's Man In the Moone, published in 1638 was influential 






Cyrano de Bergerac 
War of the Worlds 
The ~nkey's 
20 2000 Leagues Under 
Robinson Crusoe 
the Sea 
s. Besides predicting future technological advances, Dr. Johnson 
believes that science fiction writers are: 
a. Taking a strong moral stand 
b. Arguing for a slowing down of technological change 
c. Pointing to the effect of technology on the human spirit 
d. Striving mainly to amaze their readers 
6. Dr. Johnson's central thesis is that whereas science fiction 
traditionally has been an escape from reality, 
a. Science fiction has not outdistanced science 
b. The escape today is toward ever more fanciful themes 
c. Science has realized what early science fiction had 
predicted 
d. It is now recognized as a legitimate literary form 
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7. The man who flew to the moon on swans was a motif influential 
in Gulliver's Travels, according to: 
a., H. G. Wells 
b., Ray Bradbury 
c. Lord Byron 
d. ~farjorie Hope Nichols 
a. Chimeras are: 
a. Images in a laser hologram 
b. Embryonic creatures with features of more than one 
distinct species 
c. A type of science fiction fantasy 
d. Strange characters which haunted dissecting rooms 
9. The notion that travelling at high speed will cause a slowing of 
the aging process: 
a. Came from H. G. Wells' War of the Worlds 
b. Illustrates travel in another dimension 
c. Was proPosed by Albert Einstein 
d. Is the opposite of what Ray Bradbury foresaw 
10. One of the recent scientific developments which Dr. Johnson says 
was anticipated by the Buck Rogers and Fl.ash Gordon comic strips 
is: 
a. Television 
b. Advanced medical technologv 
c. Space travel 
d. Laser beams 
e. Men on the moon 
11. Domingo Gonsales was the character in an early science fiction 
account who: 
a. Experienced the dominance of moon gravity over earth 
gravity 
b. First used ray guns 
c. Invented a time machine 
d. Discovered high-speed particles 
12. Among the eources of propulsion suggested by the earliest science 
fiction writers were: 
a. Atomic power and electricity 
b. Catapults and jet thrust 
c. Wings and a whirlwind 
d. Retrorockets and trajectory plots 
13. A phenomenon which Francis Godwin wrote of and which all Apollo 
astronauts have experienced is: 
a. The slowing of time for men travelling at high speeds 
b. Gradual slipping into the Moon's gravitational pull 
c. Analagous behavior of atomic particles and orbiting 
satellites 
d. Accuracy of lasers in measuring distances 
14. Dr. Johnson sees the implanting of substitute organs in human 
beings as: 
a. A development foreseen in the creation of Mary Shelley's 
monster 
b. Fulfilling the ancient dream of immortality 
c. Indication of the close physiological ties of all men 
d. Evidence that science has gone too far 
1s. Einstein's theory of relativity was anticipated ten years 
previous! y by: 
a. Plash Gor.don 
b. H. G. Wells 
c. Ray Bradbury 
d. Jules Verne 
H. G. Wells' The Time Machine was one of the first novels to 




d. Civilization on the moon 
17. According to Dr. Johnson, early Science Fiction contained: 
a. Much space travel and little fantasy 
b. Much scientific data, and little narrative value 
c. Many predictions but few details 
d. Much satire and little science 
18. Jules Verne's version of the first Moon flight: 
a. Bore little resemblance to the actual event 
b. Placed the launch site in Massachusetts 
c. Saw the flight as a military triumph 
d. Used swans as the means of propulsion 
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19. J'ules Verne's predictions about Moon flight were accurate even 
to the point that: 
a. Astronauts experienced time distortion 
b. Launching was accomplished by a multi-stage rocket 
as he had predicted 
c. Trajectory calculations were made in the exact city 
he named 
d. Retro-rockets were used only for landing. 
2·0. Pl.ease place an "X" on the following scale indicating how you 







Rokeach Dogmatism E Scale 
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ROKEACB DOGMATISM B SCALE -
The following is a study of what the general public thinks and feels 
about a number of important social and personal questions. The best 
answer to each statement below is your personal opinion. We have 
tried to cover many diff6rent and opposing points of view; you may 
find yourself agreeing strongly with so• of the statements, disagree-
ing just as strongly with others, and perhaps uncertain about others; 
whether you agree or disagree with any statement, you can be sure that 
many people feel the same as you do. 
Mark each statement in the left margin according to how much you agree 
or disagree with it. Please mark every one. Write +1, +2, +3, or 
-1, -2, -3, depending on how you feel in each case. 
+1: I agree a little -1: I disagree a little 
+2: I agree on the whole 
+3: I agree very much 
-2: I disagree on the whole 
-3: I disagree very much 
---- 1. The United states and Russia have just about nothing in common. 
---- 2. It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future. 
---- 3. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature. 
---- 4. A man who does not believe in SOIDe great cause has not really 1 ived. 
---- s. It is only natural that a person would have a much better acquaintance with ideas he believes in than with 
ideas he opposes. 
---- 6. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several times to make sure I am being understood. 
____ 7. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this 
world there is probably only one which is correct. 
____ a. In times like these it is often necessary to be more on 
guard against ideas put out by people or groups in one's 
own c8Dlp than by those in the opposing camp. 
____ 9. When it comes to differences of opini~n in religion we 
mus~ be careful not to compromise with those who believe 
differently from the way we do. 
10. Most people just don't know what's good for them. ----
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11. in this complicated world of ours the only way we can ---- know what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts 
who can be trusted. 
120 A group which tolerates too much differences of opinion ---- among its own members cannot exist for long. 
13s The highest form of government is a democracy and the ---- highest form of democracy is a government run by those 
who are most intelligentQ 
14. There is so much to be done and so little time to do ---- it in. 
15. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't ---- worth the paper they are printed on. 
16. In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish if ---- he considers primarily his own happiness. 
17. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who ---- are for the truth and those who are against the truth. 
18~ In the long run the best way to live is to pick friends 
---- and associates whose tastes and beliefs are the $ame as 
one's own. 
19. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is ---- beneath contempt. 
20. It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward. ----
21. There are a number of people I have come to hate because ---- of the things they stand for. 
22. In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed in ---- what I am going to say that I forget to listen to what 
the others are saying .. 
23. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worth----- while goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the 
freedom of certain political groups. 
24~ I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how ---- to solve my personal problems. 
25. The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It is ---- only the future that counts. 
26. In the history of mankind there have probably been just a ---- handful of really great ,thinkers. 
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27. The worst crime a person could collllllit is to attack ---- publicly the people who believe in the same thing 
he does. 
28. Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just 
---- ·can't stop. 
29. It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal ---- or cause that life becomes meaningful. 
30. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses ---- to admit he's wrong. 
31. A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is ---- 1 ikel y to be a pretty "wishy-washy" sort of person. 
32. Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have dis----- cussed important social and moral problem.a don't really 
understand what's going on. 
33. Most people just don't give a "damn" for others. ----
34. If given the chance I would do something of great 
---- benefit to the world. 
35. While~ don't like-to admi~ this-even-to mysel~, my ---- secret ambition is to become a great man, like Einstein, 
or Beethoven, or Shakespeare. 
36. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous 
---- because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side. 
____ 37. It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's 
going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions 
of those one respects. 
38. If a man is to accomplish his mission in life it is same----- times necessary to gamble "all or nothing at all." 
____ 39. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome 
place. 
40. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do ---- something important. 
